Category

Wall Street

58 quotes from 24 investors

You never get a bubble until the public, the brokerage community, the financial institutions, the pension funds, and even the universities are all involved.
I think that accounting is a very serious issue in a lot of companies. The need to make profits every quarter and to meet analysts’ estimates can be a debilitating force.
Extrapolating existing conditions too far into the future is likely to lead to disappointment. But as long as people continue to make this mistake, and as long as the market consensus reflects it, history will continue to repeat itself in Wall Street.
The problem is not whether price changes should be disregarded — because clearly they should not be — but rather in what way can the investor and the security analyst deal intelligently with the price changes which take place.
If we assume that a very considerable amount of Wall Street activity must inevitably have elements of chance in it, then the sound idea would be to measure these chances as accurately as you can, and play the game in the direction of having the odds on your side.
To my mind, the so-called growth-stock investor — or the average security analyst for that matter — has no idea of how much to pay for a growth stock, how many stocks to buy to obtain the desired return, or how their prices will behave.
They used to say about the Bourbons that they forgot nothing and they learned nothing, and I’ll say about the Wall Street people, typically, is that they learn nothing, and they forget everything.
In 44 years of Wall Street experience and study, I have never seen dependable calculations made about common stock values, or related investment policies, that went beyond simple arithmetic or the most elementary algebra.
One of the things we tell our analysts is, if it’s in the papers, it’s in the price. Meaningful price changes only occur when new, previously unexpected information appears.
The market doesn’t lack for analysts and commentators who mine the data for patterns and declare how the future will look based on how past patterns evolved. I wish it was that easy.
I think you should try and make your money in this world by selling other people things that are good for them. If you’re selling them gambling services where you rake profits off of the top, like many of these new brokers who specialize in luring the gamblers in, I think it’s a dirty way to make money and I think that we’re crazy to allow it.
There are huge advantages for an individual to get into a position where you make a few great investments and just sit back. You’re paying less to brokers. You’re listening to less nonsense.
Wall Street has this wonderful business about how to create transactions. They set up what we believe are false expectations, and that’s what I call the “beat by a penny, missed by a penny syndrome.”
After many years of studying Wall Street’s victors and victims, I must conclude that the American public still insists on losing its savings every time the old hook is baited with the immortal easy-money worm. After every smash the blame is laid on the hook and not on the hunger.
A man who has bought a stock against the advice of a conservative broker, and has doubled his money in a fortnight, finds his suspicions turned into convictions by the impartial judge, the stock ticker.
For years I have contended that the average speculator does not lose his money in Wall Street. He loses it wherever he happens to be the instant he decides to let the ticker put unearned dollars in his pocket. The game does not beat the player; he beats himself.
I think I am safe in asserting that the margin trader, speculator, gambler, or whatever you choose to designate the average man who goes to Wall Street after easy money, does not lose money when he sells. He loses it when he buys!
It is one of the common pieces of Wall Street experience that when the public goes stock mad and the market leaders are filled with the arrogance of prolonged success, such little things as high money rates or decreases in earnings or unraised dividends have no instant effect on the market — that is, on the state of mind of the speculating public. In the end, of course, all violations of the fundamental laws of economic and financial common sense are paid for; but every bull thinks he will unload before the break.
Analysts generally regard the stock market as the passive reflection of investors’ expectations. But in fact, it is an active force in shaping them.
When investors — individual and institutional alike — engage in far more trading –inevitably with one another — than is necessary for market efficiency and ample liquidity, they become, collectively, their own worst enemies.
In all my 55 years on Wall Street, before I retired to do something vastly more important, I was never able to say when the market would go up or down. Nor was I able to find anybody on Earth whose opinion I would value on the subject of when it would go up and down.
The difficulty of determining what any stock is really worth is very great indeed. No two security analysts will agree on the worth of a stock, or even on the definition of the word.
Suppose you bought a stock cheap when it was a relatively obscure situation, and then a half-dozen Wall Street firms started cheering for the stock at the same time. I’d get concerned and think about selling. I don’t like bandwagons. I’d rather do my own thing.
If some of the most astute people in Wall Street have frequently guessed wrong in trying to profit by stock market movements, it may not be too much to assume that the attempt itself has represented a misconception of the proper function of management.
Institutional investing, as it is structured today, simply makes it more difficult to make a high-conviction, long-term decision than to make a low-conviction, short-term decision. The rewards of short-term results substantially superior to the market, and the penalties of short-term results well below the market, are awesome.
The riskiness of an investment is not measured by beta (a Wall Street term encompassing volatility and often used in measuring risk) but rather by the probability — the reasoned probability — of that investment causing its owner a loss of purchasing power over his contemplated holding period.
When the price of a stock can be influenced by a “herd” on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical.

Advertisement