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Investing

445 quotes from 69 investors

Investors must appreciate that, while there is a pattern to events, no pattern is perpetual. The more widely-held the belief in the persistence of a current trend, the less likely it is to continue.
It is not the low multiple by itself that provides unusual opportunity nor the high evaluations that carry excessive risk. It is, rather, that the level of investment anticipations is low on one side and high on the other.
As history has taught us, most of the time, most of the crowd moves long after the optimum time to have moved is passed. So it is with investment trends, which start with the belief of a few and end with the conviction of the many.
The important question for the investor is not whether conditions are good or bad (if, in fact, they can be measured on such a scale), but whether they are changing for the better or for the worse relative to expectations.
Many investors get “nickeled and dimed” into penury by failing to appreciate that the first loss is not only the best, but usually the smallest. They must learn to avoid defensive rationalization of their past bad judgments.
Too many investors fail to follow some simple, time-tested tenets that improve the odds of achieving success and, at the same time, reduce the anxiety naturally associated with an uncertain undertaking.
While the Stock Exchange list exhibits the widest diversity, in both directions, between market prices and book values, the underlying explanation is simple enough. In general, prosperous enterprises sell for more than their assets, and unsuccessful ones sell for less.
Current earnings, future prospects, management, marketability are all factors more or less independent of assets which contribute their share to the intrinsic value.
There is a considerable tendency for common stock investors to do the greater part of their buying, both of “good” and “bad” securities, at high levels of the market. They are equally inclined to do the greater part of their selling at low levels of the market, a procedure which is not conducive to successful results.
Tradition, sentiment, vague generalizations, unsubstantiated rumors, can never be made the basis of sound investment or intelligent speculation. Now and then large profits are realized on no better foundation — merely proving that sometimes luck laughs at logic.
I don’t think the objective of investment should ever be to take a risk in order to get a return. I think the objective of shrewd investment should be to find opportunities which offer a larger return than the average, combined with adequate safety.
If you can invest your money under fair conditions, in fact under attractive specific conditions, I think one certainly should do so even if the market should go down further and even if the securities you buy may also go down after you buy them.
The problem is not whether price changes should be disregarded — because clearly they should not be — but rather in what way can the investor and the security analyst deal intelligently with the price changes which take place.
Let us define the speculator as one who seeks to profit from market movements, without primary regard to intrinsic values; the “prudent stock investor” as one who (a) buys only at prices amply supported by underlying value, and (b) who determinedly reduces his stock holdings when the market enters the speculative phase of a sustained advance.
The true measure of common stocks values, of course, is not found by reference to price movements alone, but by price in relation to earnings, dividends, future prospects and, to a small extent, asset values.
To my mind, the so-called growth-stock investor — or the average security analyst for that matter — has no idea of how much to pay for a growth stock, how many stocks to buy to obtain the desired return, or how their prices will behave.
The value approach has been founded on the premise that in many — but by no means in all — cases a dependable range of valuation can be established for a common stock by analytical techniques; that often this range differs substantially from the current price; and that such differences offer rewarding opportunities for investment operations.
Real investment risk is measured not by the percent that a stock may decline in price in relation to the general market in a given period, but by the danger of a loss of quality and earning power through economic changes or deterioration in management.
The idea of measuring investment risks by price fluctuations is repugnant to me, for the very reason that it confuses what the stock market says with what actually happens to the owners’ stake in the business.
I am an exponent of the philosophy that the main objective of common stock investment should be pricing, not timing; and by pricing I mean the endeavor to buy securities at prices which are attractive, letting timing take care of itself.
It is a safe prediction for me to make that, in future years as in the past, common stocks will advance too far and decline too far, and that investors, like speculators — and institutions, like individuals — will have their periods of enchantment and disenchantment with equities.
All my experience goes to show that most investment advisers take their opinions and measures of stock values from stock prices. In the stock market, value standards do not determine prices; prices determine value standards.
In 44 years of Wall Street experience and study, I have never seen dependable calculations made about common stock values, or related investment policies, that went beyond simple arithmetic or the most elementary algebra.
Let us define the speculator as one who seeks to profit from market movements, without primary regard to intrinsic value; the prudent stock investor as one who (a) buys only at prices amply supported by underlying value, and (b) who determinedly reduces his stock holdings when the market enters the speculative phase of a sustained advance.
The true measure of common stock values, of course, is not found by reference to price movements alone, but by price in relation to earnings, dividends, future prospects and, to a small extent, asset values.
To some degree, it is the consequence of the very instability of investors’ thinking — the very variation in investor confidence — which leads them to view the picture through rosy glasses one year and through dark glasses the next year.
Good common stocks are investment media which are subject to speculative influences. The speculative influences are not in the common stocks; they are in the minds of the people who buy and sell them.
The problem of investment in common stocks is either to insulate yourselves from the speculative influences, or else to adjust your investment policy so that you can take advantage of the speculative fluctuations that are imposed upon the basic investment quality of common stocks.
People invest in stocks for two opposite reasons — in hope and confidence in the future of an enterprise or in fear that the value of their capital will be lost through inflation.
Markets are all about expectations, and the critical question for investors is always, what is discounted? Are the expectations reflected in market prices too high, or too low?
It is almost a tautology in capital markets that the best investments are those with the worst previous returns, where expectations are low, demand is down, and prospects appear at best highly uncertain.
One of the most remarkable things about the investing world is how (correctly) venerated Warren Buffett is and how completely people ignore his investing advice.
What I believe will happen in financial markets and what ends up happening have no necessary relationship. The future is uncertain, and the returns investors earn will depend on the nexus of actions taken and how events unfold.
There are always reasons why the market is down, and those reasons dominate investor’s consciousness; but current fears are reflected in current prices.
Our memory provides continuity and context to our daily activities, enabling us to recognize familiar situations, see their similarities and differences, integrate experience into a broader context, draw lessons from the past, and so on. Investment memory, though, seems considerably more short-term, selective, and sub-optimal.
The key question in markets is always what is discounted. Excess returns are earned when expectations — what is discounted — are different from what occurs.
The reason to own commodities may be that one believes they provide equity like returns with little correlation with equities. The time to own commodities is (or at least has been) when they are down, when everybody has lost money in them, and when they trade below the cost of production.
Being wrong is something anyone involved in capital markets has to get used to, though being used to it and being comfortable with it are two different things.
My view is that it is different every time, and that the relevant analytical exercise is to figure out what the differences are, what the similarities with past periods are, and what it all means, so that one can make sensible investment decisions.
Investing is all about probabilities, and just because there appears to be a strong consensus prices are going to keep going up, doesn’t mean that is wrong, or right. The consensus does tend to be wrong at the turning points, being invariably bullish at the top and bearish at the bottom.
While markets constantly change and adapt, grow ever more complicated, interconnected and global, the principles that underlie successful, long-term investing have remained pretty much the same as they have always been.
Price and value are not only different, it is precisely that they can differ widely that creates the opportunities for value investors to earn excess returns. The greater the difference, the greater the potential return.
For value investors, price is one thing, and value is another. When prices move against us, it usually means that the gap between price and value is growing, and our future expected rates of return are higher.
There is a tendency to look to the past and say, these things have done well and therefore that’s the way you should invest — as opposed to saying where are the greatest investment opportunities going forward.
For most investors in general, selling the expensive asset, and buying the cheap asset, seems like a logical strategy — except when you actually try to do it. Because most people are actually not wired to be selling what’s expensive and going up, and buying what’s cheap and going down.
If you have a valuation discipline, then you know that stock prices change more rapidly than business value. You also know that rising stock prices mean lower future rates of return and falling stock prices mean higher rates of return.
A lot of people look to hit singles and sacrifice bunts and make small returns. But statistically you are far better off with huge gains because you are going to make mistakes. And if you are playing small ball and you make a few mistakes, you can’t recover.
In general, stocks are not undervalued because they go up over some short time frame. But it’s hard to make a case that they’re not undervalued if they go up year after year over long periods of time — especially when they’ve provided excess rates of return over the market.
Passive management does not give investors the return of the index; it gives them the return of the index less costs. So, the longer they have their money passively managed, the greater their underperformance will be relative to the index.
Large losses are forever – in investing, in teenage driving, and in fidelity. If you avoid large losses with a strong defense, the winnings will have every opportunity to take care of themselves. And large losses are almost always caused by trying to get too much by taking too much risk.
Most of the destruction of investment value occurs in small, private anguishing experiences that are never discussed and never recorded, because people were doing things they never should have done.
Contrary to their oft-articulated goal of outperforming the market averages, investment managers are not beating the market: The market is beating them.
If you’re going to invest in stocks for the long term, or real estate, of course, there are going to be periods when there’s a lot of agony and other periods when there’s a boom. I think you just have to learn to live through them.
I think people have the theory that any intelligent, hard-working person can get to be a great investor. I think any intelligent person can get to be pretty good as an investor and avoid certain obvious traps. But I don’t think everybody can be a great investor.
There are huge advantages for an individual to get into a position where you make a few great investments and just sit back. You’re paying less to brokers. You’re listening to less nonsense.
If a money manager cannot explain in plain English what their investment principles are, they probably don’t have any. And if they cannot explain their process for finding and researching an investment idea, they probably don’t have that either.
Every basis point of return — let alone every 100 basis points — has a staggering difference in outcomes in the long run. That’s why you stay focused on the long term and the rate of return; that is where the difference is, that is what you want and need to capture.
In any diversified portfolio, there will be both winners and losers, and the consideration that should determine which you should sell, if any, is certainly not the price at which you bought it originally.
It turns out that when people have to sell a stock from their portfolio, they are not rational between winners and losers. People tend to sell winners and hang on to their losers. The psychology of that is quite straightforward.
Individual investors tend to churn their accounts, they tend to trade too much, and that they trade too much seems to be due to over-confidence. They believe they know something that they do not know and this is one essential characteristic of human beings, which makes them different from rational beings.
The investor is bombarded with staggering amounts of information, staggering amounts of stimuli that are designed to get the investor to buy and sell and trade, to do exactly the wrong thing, to create excessive profits for these intermediaries that aren’t acting in the investor’s best interests.
If you talk to a businessman, a businessman is going to feed the winners and kill the losers. But in the investment world, when you’ve got a winner you should be suspicious about what’s next. And if you’ve got a loser, you should be hopeful — although not naively hopeful.
The very best investors are the ones who invest according to their own psyche. You find that their investment styles are consistent with their personalities, their intellects, their approaches to work. It’s not somebody else’s style; it’s their own, and it’s deeply ingrained.
The reason for dwelling on the virtue of simple investment approaches is that complicated ones, which can’t be explained simply, may be disguising a more basic defect. They may not make any sense.
When I shifted my focus from beating gambling games to analyzing the stock market, I naively thought that I was leaving a world where cheating at cards was then problematic and entering an arena where regulation and the rule of law gave investors a fair playing field. Instead, I learned that bigger stakes attracted bigger thieves.
Intelligent speculators and investors who do not play the market feverishly do not need to spend the day beside a ticker or before a quotation board.
I know that stocks represent fractional ownership in businesses and that, over time, the stock market will reflect their true intrinsic values. And crises bring worries and fears that make many investors forget that simple fact.
The principle of “managed” investment trusts is absolutely sound, granted only one premise. The premise is that there are somewhere people of such experience and insight that they can predict with some sort of accuracy the future behavior of securities.
Analysts generally regard the stock market as the passive reflection of investors’ expectations. But in fact, it is an active force in shaping them.
Our attitude toward cash generation and asset management came out of our own thought process. It is not copied. After we acquired a number of businesses we reflected on aspects of business. Our own conclusion was that the key was cash flow.
Establishing and maintaining an unconventional investment profile requires acceptance of uncomfortably idiosyncratic portfolios which frequently appear downright imprudent in the eyes of conventional wisdom.
One of the important factors behind the fluctuation between bull and bear markets, between booms and crashes and bubbles, is that investor memory has to fail us – and fail universally – in order for the extremes to be reached.
The pendulum of investment psychology is constantly fluctuating between optimism and pessimism, between greed and fear, between credulousness and skepticism, between risk tolerance and risk aversion.
It’s not what you buy, it’s what you pay. And success in investing doesn’t come from buying good things, but from buying things well. And if you don’t know the difference, you’re in the wrong business.
Investing is a funny business. It’s really easy to be average. Just buy an index fund. It’s really hard to be above average.
It’s important to recognize that the riskiness of investing comes only partly from the things you invest in. A lot of the risk comes from the behavior of the participants.
Extrapolation is usually right, but not valuable, and predictions of deviation from trends are potentially profitable but rarely right. So far, macro-economic forecasting doesn’t represent the path to superior investments.
There’s no asset so good that it can’t be overpriced and become a bad investment, and very few assets are so bad they can’t be underpriced and be a good investment.
On average, the average large-stock fund manager produces average returns before fees and below-average returns after fees. So compared with after-fee returns, an index fund is superior.
I spend a great deal of my personal time trying to figure out one thing, which is, at a given point in time, how should you balance aggressiveness and defensiveness in your portfolio.
Whenever we consider an investment, we think just as much or more about what can go wrong as about what can go right, and we put the avoidance of losses on a high pedestal.
A great mob of easily led investors, eagerly searching for “straight tips” which may bring instant wealth, make their mistake in common, and when the mistake is disastrous they try, en masse, to escape.
I think there is a mindset among many professional investors that if I go down the drain, well it is o.k. as long as everyone else is going down the drain with me.
You can’t be a good value investor without being an independent thinker – you’re seeing valuations that the market is not appreciating. But it’s critical that you understand why the market isn’t seeing the value you do.
Over the very long run, it is the economics of investing — enterprise — that has determined total return; the evanescent emotions of investing — speculation — so important over the short run, have ultimately proven to be virtually meaningless.
When investors — individual and institutional alike — engage in far more trading –inevitably with one another — than is necessary for market efficiency and ample liquidity, they become, collectively, their own worst enemies.
Booms start with some tie-in to reality, some reason which justifies the increase in asset values, and then — and this is the critical feature of speculative mood — the market loses touch with reality.
For us the principal test is creditworthiness, don’t buy common stocks of companies that need continuous access to capital markets.
We don’t get involved in all the analytical baggage of trying to figure out where a stock is going to sell. Just try to figure out what it’s worth. And I dare say all the really great investors do it the same way.
I learned how to work on what’s cheap. I became a total believer. To this day I think that is the only way to invest.
Economic development or growth occurs in three different processes: in the increase of population, in the accumulation of capital, and in the technological progress which enables us to produce more things, better things, different things, or the same things more cheaply.
It is not the market that is rising or falling at any moment, even if we commonly speak as though it were. In truth, prices move in response to the buying and selling decisions of countless investors, who are constantly considering the likely decisions of countless others
So long as a capitalist system persists and the financial markets hold together, equities do have a built-in long-term rate of return. That rate of return is a nominal measure of the economy.
Survival as an investor over that famous long course depends from the very first on recognition that we do not know what is going to happen. We can speculate or calculate or estimate, but we can never be certain.
Unless you are that rarest of birds, someone who is cool under the rapid-fire, high-pressure decision making required to maximize your returns, let others take such risks, and allow your portfolio to plug along at a slower speed. In investing, tortoises tend to win far more often than hares over the turns of the market cycle.
There is evidence that the stock market is more efficient in processing information about what other investors are doing than it is in processing fundamental information about the underlying assets, which is why stock prices so often turn out with hindsight to have been crazy rather than rational.
If it’s a choice between investing in a good company in a great industry, or a great company in a lousy industry, I’ll take the great company in the lousy industry any day. Good management, a strong balance sheet, and a sensible plan of action will overcome many obstacles, but when you’ve got weak management, a weak balance sheet, and a misguided plan of action, the greatest industry in the world won’t bail you out.
People spend all this time trying to figure out “What time of the year should I make an investment? When should I invest?” And it’s such a waste of time. It’s so futile.
I’ve been fully invested at the start of all the major declines and I will be fully invested in the next one. I am not a market predictor, that’s for darn sure.
The very top officers of a company ought to have the equivalent of one year’s salary invested in the company. If they can’t demonstrate such faith in their own ability, why should I?
Common stocks properly selected and long-range will prove so attractive that I don’t believe that other forms of assets are a more attractive or suitable vehicle.
It is just appalling the nerve strain people put themselves under trying to buy something today and sell it tomorrow. It’s a small-win proposition. If you are a truly long-range investor, of which I am practically a vanishing breed, the profits are so tremendously greater.
It is true that you don’t go broke taking a profit, but that assumes you will make a profit on everything you do. It doesn’t allow for the mistakes you’re bound to make in the investment business.
Institutional investing, as it is structured today, simply makes it more difficult to make a high-conviction, long-term decision than to make a low-conviction, short-term decision. The rewards of short-term results substantially superior to the market, and the penalties of short-term results well below the market, are awesome.
I think you have to be an undying optimist, and perhaps a Pollyanna to enjoy and to be successful at managing common stock portfolios over a long period of time.
To beat the market is not easy. In addition to a good investment manager, the investor needs perspective, patience, and courage — qualities that do not abound in today’s intensely competitive world.
The investment counsel business, as it is traditionally practiced, and probably as it should be practiced, is a simple process of making sure that clients never have so much risk exposure that their capital or standard of living can be impaired by some specific negative surprise.
Investors in distressed property are motivated primarily by the expectation that the equity value of a real estate asset acquired at less than its original cost-to-construct will in time increase to a point that justifies its original indebtedness.
I look at situations and act when I think the problems are temporary. I believed if you could buy assets with sufficient ability to carry them then over time you could not lose.
Early on I adopted a philosophy I call the Eleventh Commandment, “Thou shalt not take thyself too seriously,” and it became a governing principle in my life. Big investment deals can get heady at times, and it can be easy to start thinking your brand is bigger than your performance.
Real estate investment decisions do not lend themselves to macroeconomic issues. Real estate is a local market, by definition. lt is not possible to focus on national trends; one must focus on local issues and characteristics.
Rather than focus on numerical indexes in investment decisions, the investor should focus on unique characteristics that protect the investment from competition. Thus bar to access is a critical element in the evaluation.
I don’t think there’ll ever be another Buffett, partly for the longevity, but partly because many people could never sustain that kind of return without blowing up.
The ability to not be getting margin calls, not be having redemptions, not be scared out of your mind when something’s gone against you is probably the most enhancing thing to long term returns.
Investors who find an overly narrow niche to inhabit, prosper for a time but then usually stagnate. Those who move on when the world changes at least have the chance to adapt successfully.
The line I draw in the sand is that if an asset has cash flow or the likelihood of cash flow in the near term and is not purely dependent on what a future buyer might pay, then it’s an investment. If an asset’s value is totally dependent on the amount a future buyer might pay, then its purchase is speculation.
If the stock market has a period of outperformance of its long-term return, it is inevitably followed by some period of underperformance. But people being optimistic and greedy by nature take the recent short-term outperformance of stocks as a sign of good things to come, rather than a warning of bad things to come.
It turns out that value investing is something that is in your blood. There are people who just don’t have the patience and discipline to do it, and there are people who do. So it leads me to think it’s genetic.
Investors should always keep in mind that the most important metric is not the returns achieved but the returns weighed against the risks incurred.
The best investors do not target return; they focus first on risk, and only then decide whether the projected return justifies taking each particular risk.
The tendency of investors to follow the market’s momentum and bet on whatever has worked recently is accompanied by antipathy to whatever hasn’t.
Investors must never mistake an investment that is down in price for one that is bargain-priced; undervaluation is determined only by a security’s price compared to its underlying value.
We consider for each of our investments not only whether a security is undervalued but why it is undervalued. If the reason is that there are uninformed or emotional sellers, we become more comfortable.
It is always easiest to run with the herd; at times, it can take a deep reservoir of courage and conviction to stand apart from it. Yet distancing yourself from the crowd is an essential component of long-term investment success.
As an investor you never have perfect information, and the biggest profits are always available when competition and information are scarce.
In investing, nothing is certain. The best investments we have ever made, that in retrospect seem like free money, seemed not at all that way when we made them.
It is only in a bear market that the value investing discipline becomes especially important because value investing, virtually alone among strategies, gives you exposure to the upside with limited downside risk.
The main underlying principle of value investing is that you should invest in undervalued securities because they alone offer a margin of safety.
Higher risk investments often erode one’s capital and produce lower returns — the worst of all investment worlds. Higher-returns-for-higher-risks only applies on average and over time.
Price is the essential determinant in every investment equation. At some price, every company is a buy; at some price, every company is a hold; and at a still higher price, every company is a sell. We do not really recognize the concept of a value company.
The first thing I heard when I got in the business, not from my mentor, was bulls make money, bears make money, and pigs get slaughtered. I’m here to tell you I was a pig. And I strongly believe the only way to make long-term returns in our business that are superior is by being a pig.
When picking a list of growth stocks for long-term investment, broad diversification of the risk is the first and most important principle to follow. No one can look ahead five or ten years and say what is the most promising industry or the best stock to own.
Investing is kind of a game of connecting the dots. The nice thing about it is the longer you are in the business, as long as you are intellectually curious, your collection of data points of dots gets bigger and bigger.
I’ve always said you might as well assume the world is going to work, because if it doesn’t, it doesn’t really matter what your investment portfolio looks like.
The more a business serves others, and the more problems they solve, the more profitable they will be and the more an investor in those enterprises should make.
It’s a personal quirk of mine that when the CEO shows up on magazine covers as a celebrity, I’m automatically hesitant to invest in the stock.
The worst business in the world is the one that doesn’t earn good returns on capital but still needs gobs of it going forward.
Successful investing requires the management of your own ego and temperament and usually that of your clients as well.
As an investor in businesses, which generate enormous cash flows, my single most important issue to get right is what management will do with cash flow through reinvestment. Do they care about the owner, or do they care about themselves?
So many investors today focus on earnings, but I focus on assets and don’t try to predict next months’ earnings, which is a much more difficult approach to investing.
The problem in investing, I think, is timing. You may be right. But in the long run, we’re all dead. Even if you’re right, if it takes 20 years to work out, it can be a disaster.
The riskiness of an investment is not measured by beta (a Wall Street term encompassing volatility and often used in measuring risk) but rather by the probability — the reasoned probability — of that investment causing its owner a loss of purchasing power over his contemplated holding period.
I would rather sustain the penalties resulting from over-conservatism than face the consequences of error, perhaps with permanent capital loss, resulting from the adoption of a “New Era” philosophy where trees really do grow to the sky.
It is obvious that a variation of merely a few percentage points has an enormous effect on the success of a compounding (investment) program. It is also obvious that this effect mushrooms as the period lengthens.
The addition of the one-hundredth stock simply can’t reduce the potential variance in portfolio performance sufficiently to compensate for the negative effect its inclusion has on the overall portfolio expectation.
The availability of a quotation for your business interest (stock) should always be an asset to be utilized if desired. If it gets silly enough in either direction, you take advantage of it. Its availability should never be turned into a liability whereby its periodic aberrations, in turn, formulate your judgments.
I am willing to trade the pains (forget about the pleasures) of substantial short term variance in exchange for maximization of long term performance. However, I am not willing to incur risk of substantial permanent capital loss in seeking to better long term performance.
I will not abandon a previous approach whose logic I understand even though it may mean foregoing large and apparently easy, profits to embrace an approach which I don’t fully understand, have not practiced successfully and which, possibly, could lead to substantial permanent loss of capital.
The tour we’ve taken through the last century proves that market irrationality of an extreme kind periodically erupts — and compellingly suggests that investors wanting to do well had better learn how to deal with the next outbreak.
The key to investing is not assessing how much an industry is going to affect society, or how much it will grow, but rather determining the competitive advantage of any given company and, above all, the durability of that advantage.

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