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Stock Market

117 quotes from 28 investors

Extrapolating existing conditions too far into the future is likely to lead to disappointment. But as long as people continue to make this mistake, and as long as the market consensus reflects it, history will continue to repeat itself in Wall Street.
While the Stock Exchange list exhibits the widest diversity, in both directions, between market prices and book values, the underlying explanation is simple enough. In general, prosperous enterprises sell for more than their assets, and unsuccessful ones sell for less.
If we assume that a very considerable amount of Wall Street activity must inevitably have elements of chance in it, then the sound idea would be to measure these chances as accurately as you can, and play the game in the direction of having the odds on your side.
If we really knew what the future will bring that is all we would have to know; but since stock market people can only guess the future and since they have the embarrassing habit of guessing wrongly, it seems best not to lay too much stress upon forecasts.
Participation in the stock market is not limited to the experienced, the conservative, nor even the intelligent. It is a game at which any number of people may play. And as the market level rises, the quantity of players grows rapidly and their quality diminishes somewhat in proportion.
The idea of measuring investment risks by price fluctuations is repugnant to me, for the very reason that it confuses what the stock market says with what actually happens to the owners’ stake in the business.
They used to say about the Bourbons that they forgot nothing and they learned nothing, and I’ll say about the Wall Street people, typically, is that they learn nothing, and they forget everything.
All my experience goes to show that most investment advisers take their opinions and measures of stock values from stock prices. In the stock market, value standards do not determine prices; prices determine value standards.
In 44 years of Wall Street experience and study, I have never seen dependable calculations made about common stock values, or related investment policies, that went beyond simple arithmetic or the most elementary algebra.
Mathematics is ordinarily considered as producing precise and dependable results; but in the stock market the more elaborate and abstruse the mathematics the more uncertain and speculative are the conclusions we draw therefrom.
There are two principal mistakes that nearly all amateurs in the stock market make. The first is to have an inexact knowledge of the securities in which one is dealing, to know too little about a company’s management, its earnings, and prospects for future growth. The second mistake is to trade beyond one’s financial resources, to try to run up a fortune on a shoestring.
The stock market registers the judgments of multitudes of buyers and sellers about the many factors which affect business — what business is like today; what it will be like in the future.
Using the outlook for the economy to predict the direction of the stock market, which most appear to do, has it exactly backward. The stock market’s behavior will predict the economy’s future behavior.
Wall Street has this wonderful business about how to create transactions. They set up what we believe are false expectations, and that’s what I call the “beat by a penny, missed by a penny syndrome.”
When I shifted my focus from beating gambling games to analyzing the stock market, I naively thought that I was leaving a world where cheating at cards was then problematic and entering an arena where regulation and the rule of law gave investors a fair playing field. Instead, I learned that bigger stakes attracted bigger thieves.
After many years of studying Wall Street’s victors and victims, I must conclude that the American public still insists on losing its savings every time the old hook is baited with the immortal easy-money worm. After every smash the blame is laid on the hook and not on the hunger.
Firmly believing that stock speculation is an unbeatable game, I have come to the conclusion that while no bear operator ever made a large fortune in the stock market and kept it, unless he trusteed it, the greatest losses are sustained by the bulls, not because they are bulls, but because there are more of them — more optimists than pessimists.
On October 24, 1929, millions of Americans recalled poignantly the hundreds of blithe prophecies that our feelings never again would be harrowed by absurd exhibitions of mob hysteria or mass emotionalism in the stock market. We were living in a new era.
For years I have contended that the average speculator does not lose his money in Wall Street. He loses it wherever he happens to be the instant he decides to let the ticker put unearned dollars in his pocket. The game does not beat the player; he beats himself.
I think I am safe in asserting that the margin trader, speculator, gambler, or whatever you choose to designate the average man who goes to Wall Street after easy money, does not lose money when he sells. He loses it when he buys!
In the beginning of a stock market boom it is ever the “dear public,” the fleecy lambs, the most guileless victims, who make the most money. They really do not know when to stop winning, and so in the end they lose profit and principal.
It is one of the common pieces of Wall Street experience that when the public goes stock mad and the market leaders are filled with the arrogance of prolonged success, such little things as high money rates or decreases in earnings or unraised dividends have no instant effect on the market — that is, on the state of mind of the speculating public. In the end, of course, all violations of the fundamental laws of economic and financial common sense are paid for; but every bull thinks he will unload before the break.
I know that stocks represent fractional ownership in businesses and that, over time, the stock market will reflect their true intrinsic values. And crises bring worries and fears that make many investors forget that simple fact.
Analysts generally regard the stock market as the passive reflection of investors’ expectations. But in fact, it is an active force in shaping them.
Of all the mysteries of the stock exchange there is none so impenetrable as why there should be a buyer for everyone who seeks to sell. October 24, 1929 showed that what is mysterious is not inevitable. Often there were no buyers, and only wide vertical declines could anyone be induced to bid.
In all my 55 years on Wall Street, before I retired to do something vastly more important, I was never able to say when the market would go up or down. Nor was I able to find anybody on Earth whose opinion I would value on the subject of when it would go up and down.
There is evidence that the stock market is more efficient in processing information about what other investors are doing than it is in processing fundamental information about the underlying assets, which is why stock prices so often turn out with hindsight to have been crazy rather than rational.
The thesis underlying everything, whether you’re an actively managed fund or a passive fund, is that the U.S. will be OK. If you don’t believe that, you shouldn’t be in the stock market.
A lot of my stocks don’t work. The beauty of the stock market is that if you are wrong, if you put $1,000 up, all you lose is $1,000. I have proven that many times.
You get recessions, you have stock market declines. If you don’t understand that’s going to happen, then you’re not ready. You won’t do well in the markets. If you go to Minnesota in January, you should know it’s gonna be cold. You don’t panic when the thermometer falls below zero.
I have lost a lot of money in some bad savings and loans. I have lost money in bad banks. And I have lost money in electronics companies. It is very easy to lose money in the stock market.
So the stock market will definitely have a correction. Everybody will say that it is the end of the world. I predict it. They will say the big one’s coming.
The stock market has a 100% record, in the last 50 years, of predicting upturns in the economy. It’s never been wrong. It’s less than 50-50 on a downturn.
Suppose you bought a stock cheap when it was a relatively obscure situation, and then a half-dozen Wall Street firms started cheering for the stock at the same time. I’d get concerned and think about selling. I don’t like bandwagons. I’d rather do my own thing.
If some of the most astute people in Wall Street have frequently guessed wrong in trying to profit by stock market movements, it may not be too much to assume that the attempt itself has represented a misconception of the proper function of management.
Most useful and most dangerous are the stock market averages, most useful in revealing the general trend of the market, most dangerous if they mislead the trader into forgetting that, after all, his profits depend on the movements of the individual stocks in which he deals.
One thing all of us know for sure is that the stock market doesn’t go down just because a lot of folks think that it has entered the heart of looney land.
The stock market itself seems to be mainly driven by fashions and fads. However, when you look at individual stocks, it’s a different story, because individual stocks are much more diverse, and some of them can be predicted to perform well over the long run.
If you think of the stock market as a cauldron of minestrone soup that occasionally somebody sticks a ladle in and stirs up, it takes a while before all the vegetables float back to the level that they were at before.
If the stock market has a period of outperformance of its long-term return, it is inevitably followed by some period of underperformance. But people being optimistic and greedy by nature take the recent short-term outperformance of stocks as a sign of good things to come, rather than a warning of bad things to come.
It is crucial to have a strategy in place before problems hit, precisely because no one can accurately predict the future direction of the stock market or economy.
The riskiness of an investment is not measured by beta (a Wall Street term encompassing volatility and often used in measuring risk) but rather by the probability — the reasoned probability — of that investment causing its owner a loss of purchasing power over his contemplated holding period.
The course of the stock market will determine, to a great degree, when we will be right, but the accuracy of our analysis of the company will largely determine whether we will be right. In other words, we tend to concentrate on what should happen, not when it should happen.
I am willing to trade the pains (forget about the pleasures) of substantial short term variance in exchange for maximization of long term performance. However, I am not willing to incur risk of substantial permanent capital loss in seeking to better long term performance.
When the price of a stock can be influenced by a “herd” on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical.

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